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Abstract
This article studies the development of European foreign policy from an informational perspective. 
It illustrates how since the establishment of European Political Cooperation in 1970, the European 
Union has gradually evolved from a platform to share foreign policy information into a Brussels-
based system that  gathers  and processes  information  autonomously.  Building  upon the  broader 
literature of delegation in international organisations, it explains the gradual shift in the centre of 
informational  gravity  from the  national  capitals  to  Brussels  through  motives  of  efficiency  and 
credibility. The development of an operational foreign policy after the Treaty of Amsterdam has 
considerably raised the demands for rapid and high quality data. A system entirely dependent on the 
ad hoc information flows from the member states proved incompatible with these new ambitions. 
The recent establishment of the European External Action Service and the transformation of the 
European Commission delegations into Union delegations is the most recent step in this long-term 
and highly institutionalised process of European informational cooperation. 
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Introduction
Information is a key resource in public policy‐making. Given that policy‐making typically consists 
of  assessing  the  anticipated  payoffs of  alternative  courses  of  action,  it  is  essential  for  political 
decision‐makers to possess adequate and reliable information about the current state of affairs. This 
is particularly important in foreign policy (George 1980; Epstein and O'Halloran 1999). States thus 
have an incentive to optimise their information‐gathering and processing capabilities and they have 
done so over the last centuries — without exception — through the establishment of ministries of 
foreign affairs and diplomatic services. It should be emphasised that the activities of collecting and 
analysing foreign policy information were, due to their sensitive nature, mostly limited to actions of  
states.  Each  state  had  its  own  apparatus  resulting  from  the  principle  of  ‘self‐help’  in  the 
international system. Information‐sharing only occurred on an ad hoc and strategic basis and non‐
state actors did not play a major role in the bilateral ‘dialogue between states’ (Watson 1982).
In the context of the European Union (EU), individual member states have changed their 
methods  of  gathering  and  processing  information.  Over  the  last  40  years,  there  has  been  an 
incremental institutionalisation of information‐sharing with the result that information about foreign 
2policy is now shared continuously in all major dossiers. More recently, the member states have also 
established  various  analytical  bodies  in  Brussels  that  perform  information‐processing  tasks 
autonomously in support of the common policies. These bureaucracies provide the member states 
with strategy papers, risk assessments, crisis management concepts, and draft common positions. 
Most of these analyses are still informed by input from the member states and open sources, yet the 
European bureaucracies are also increasingly engaged in information‐gathering of their own. The 
creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the transformation of the external 
delegations  of  the  European  Commission  into  Union  delegations  will  further  enhance  these 
functions. This article explains why the EU has developed, over time, from a platform for sharing 
foreign policy information into a collector and processor of information in its own right.
Building upon the broader literature of delegation in international organisations, it argues 
that the ambition of the member states to develop an operational foreign policy has led them to go 
beyond information sharing. Driven by motives of efficiency and credibility, they have established 
European‐level bodies for information‐gathering and processing.  Explaining why member states 
intensively  share  information  and  have  delegated  some  of  their  information‐gathering  and 
processing  is  particularly  relevant.  After  all,  it  is  widely  recognised  that  the  possession  of 
information empowers certain actors over others in the process of foreign policy‐making (Downs 
and Rocke 1994; Milner 1997). Although the member states thus benefit from sharing information 
and from the support of Brussels‐based bureaucracies analysing and gathering data, they are also 
increasingly losing control over foreign policy information.
This article fits in with a larger body of literature on the evolution of foreign policy‐making 
in the context of the European Union. Similar contributions to date have focused on the formal 
division of competences between the national and European level or on the role of civil servants in 
Brussels  (see  Allen  1998;  Müller‐Brandeck‐Bocquet  2002;  Vanhoonacker,  Dijkstra  and  Maurer 
2010). Such approaches, however,  ignore informal processes of policy‐making or put too much 
emphasis on the EU rather than the European foreign policy system as a whole.1 They thus at best 
describe and measure activity indirectly. This article starts with explaining the role of information in 
foreign policy generally, before discussing the changing politics of information in European foreign 
policy in a chronological fashion.
Information‐Sharing and Information‐Delegation in Foreign Policy
Before discussing the role of information in foreign policy, it is important to provide some clarity 
on the terminology. This article focuses primarily on the processes of gathering and processing 
information, both of which have the aim of reducing the uncertainty of policy‐makers when making  
and executing decisions regarding foreign policy (Warner 2002; Walsh 2006; Müller‐Wille 2008). 
In this context it is important to note the following. First, foreign policy information differs from 
intelligence (which can be seen as a sub‐category of information) in that it is neither necessarily 
secretive nor solely concerned with security issues. Second, given that states remain the key actors 
within the international system, most of the gathering and processing of information is done by 
states. Third, three important underlying assumptions must be made: (a) the future is uncertain and 
information can help to reduce such uncertainty, (b) foreign policy information is a scarce resource 
and not automatically available to all international actors, and (c) actors are ‘boundedly rational’, 
meaning  that  they  have  limited  time  and  cognitive  skills.  Political  leaders,  when  making  and 
executing  foreign  policy  decisions,  therefore  have  to  rely  on  supporting  bureaucracies  for  the 
gathering and processing of information.
States gather their foreign policy information via three different channels: they have their 
own autonomous capabilities, they receive information from other international actors, and they use 
1 European foreign policy is defined as the sum of what the EU and its member states do in terms of their ‘political’ 
foreign policy (Hill 1998). It excludes trade and development.
3publicly available sources (e.g., media, reports by think tanks and universities, and the internet). 
While  the  latter  two channels are  essential  for  day‐to‐day policy‐making, and while  individual 
politicians  sometimes  prefer  to  use  such  sources,  various  academic  observers  have  empirically 
established that first‐hand information collected by a state's own administration is usually more 
desirable (see Bull 1977; Watson 1982; Hocking 1999; Hill 2003). Given that survival is ultimately 
determined  by  strategic  decisions,  and  these  decisions  rely  on  informational  input,  states  are 
generally reluctant to ‘outsource’ their information‐gathering capabilities — whether it is to other 
international actors or based on open sources. Instead, many states have established networks of 
foreign  services  so  that  they  can  collect  their  own  information.2 Such  services  are,  however, 
expensive; hence, their provision may come at the expense of other activities funded by the same 
national budget. The marginal costs and benefits of acquiring additional foreign policy information 
through autonomous channels must therefore be assessed. Costs help to explain why some states, 
usually those with more global interests and greater resources, maintain more extensive diplomatic 
services than others.
The information that is gathered subsequently needs to be processed. Just as foreign policy 
decision‐makers (such as presidents, foreign ministers or under‐secretaries) cannot collect all the 
relevant  information  themselves,  neither  do  they  have  the  time,  the  analytical  capabilities,  or 
expertise in foreign policy to analyse it (see George 1980; Vertzberger 1990). For analysis, they 
have supporting bureaucracies, such as foreign ministries in the capitals, at their disposal, just as 
they have networks of diplomatic services for gathering information (Watson 1982). It needs to be 
said, though, that although analytically the gathering and processing of information may usefully be 
separated, in practice there is not always a clear distinction between them. Individual ambassadors 
possess significant expertise and are generally already making analyses when writing diplomatic 
telegrams to their capitals. Civil servants in the foreign ministries may consult open sources directly 
without being in contact with the diplomatic posts, just as they may also be in direct contact with 
their counterparts in other states.
The high cost of autonomous information‐gathering is a major incentive for states to engage 
in information‐sharing. Even for large states the costs of autonomously collecting all foreign policy 
information are simply too high (Richelson 1990).  States may also not have the opportunity to 
gather all the necessary input independently. For example, western countries face great difficulties 
in collecting human intelligence in the Middle East. They must therefore rely on local intelligence 
services (Betts 2002). Information‐sharing, however, also has clear drawbacks. Trust is a necessary 
condition for the effective sharing of information (Walsh 2006). The risk that sources and methods 
may be compromised is ever present as is the chance that gathered information reaches third‐party 
states.3 Providers  of  information,  nonetheless,  may  have  incentives  to  share  their  information, 
because it can affect the decisions or actions of the recipient in ways that benefits the sender. There 
is  furthermore  the  issue  of  reciprocity  in  that  sharing  information  engenders  trust.  This  is 
particularly relevant, as Smith (2004, 91) put it, when states try to ‘establish a common view of, and 
potential solution to, problems’, which may explain the institutionalisation of information‐sharing. 
Yet it needs to be stressed that eventually it is the sender of information that makes the cost‐benefit 
analysis on whether information‐sharing yields positive payoffs.
Since the sharing of information is often politically motivated, such information is sender‐
biased (Crawford and Sobel 1982), which makes it difficult to come to common views of problems, 
let alone solutions. If joint decisions and actions yield high mutual payoffs for states, they thus have 
to  find  ways  to  come  to  common analysis.  One  way  is  to  delegate  the  task  of  information‐
processing to international organisations, which are due to their neutral reputation more credible in 
their analysis of the information (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Hawkins et al. 2006). Apart from the 
2 Diplomatic posts also serve other purposes than information‐gathering, but the collection of information constitutes 
a key function.
3 The recent Wikileaks affair only emphasises this point.
4credibility argument,  having one centralized bureaucracy in charge of information‐processing is 
also more efficient than the various national administrations processing independently. It not only 
reduces the number of required civil servants nationally, it also demands less coordination between 
states, which can be an obstacle when rapid response is required. Furthermore, giving the pen to one 
actor is more efficient than drafting documents with multiple member states in working groups. 
When solely delegating the task of information‐processing while keeping information gathering ‘in‐
house’, states remain in control of the information that flows into these organisations (Stone 2009).
There are also cases where states have delegated information‐gathering tasks as well. This is 
particularly attractive when they are themselves not in a position to provide credible information by 
their  own  actions  (e.g.,  inspections  of  nuclear  facilities,  election  observation,  monitoring 
implementation) (Keohane 1984; Hawkins et al. 2006; Milner and Moravcsik 2009). Furthermore 
neutrality  and  efficiency  considerations  are  important.  By  delegating  fact  finding  or  technical 
assessment  missions  to  international  organisations,  for  example,  the  states  that  engage in  joint 
decisions and actions receive relatively unbiased information at a lower cost than if they went to the 
region themselves. Examples of the need for efficiency are international peacekeeping operations, 
where the commander cannot wait  for the contributing states to provide him/her  with situation 
awareness and intelligence reports. Indeed, in such missions states delegate the responsibility of 
information‐gathering, and regular reporting goes the other way around — from the mission to the 
contributing states via the respective international organisation. For national purposes, states may 
still keep their own channels open after delegating these tasks, but the international organisations 
are no longer solely dependant on states for their information.
When  delegating  the  tasks  of  information‐gathering  and  information‐processing  to 
international  organisations,  states  necessarily  have  to  balance  the  costs  and  the  benefits  of 
delegation. Delegation inevitably leads to  agency losses and may empower those actors to whom 
the tasks have been delegated. In a classic principal–agent model, an informational surplus is indeed 
the most significant resource of the agent to whom tasks have been delegated (see Arrow 1985; 
Pollack 2003; Miller 2005). A common paradox thus arises, in which the sharing of information and 
the  delegation  of  informational  tasks  to  improve  the  quality  of  strategic  decisions  leads  to  a  
situation in which states are losing control over policy‐making, with the international organization 
concerned becoming empowered. States anticipate this when delegating tasks of an informational 
nature and are thus reluctant to do so. Indeed, delegation might lead to sub‐optimal situations from 
the viewpoint of efficiency, because as Stone (2009, 35) rightly notes ‘it  may be the case that 
principals  would like to  delegate  more functions to  international  institutions,  but  do not  do so 
because they cannot control the institution's policies’.
Before providing empirical evidence of how European foreign policy has developed from an 
informational perspective,  a few general comments on the nature of the EU are required.  First, 
while the EU is not a state, its member states collectively engage in joint decisions and action, for 
which they require foreign policy information. Second, European foreign policy remains largely 
driven by its member states. As a result, the ‘centre of gravity’ of information lies with the member  
states themselves. Nevertheless, the last 40 years have seen a gradual process whereby Brussels‐
based players have become increasingly important. The establishment of the European External 
Action Service is the most recent step in this long process. Third, there are substantial differences  
between the foreign policies of individual member states, in that two are permanent members of the 
United Nations Security Council and possess nuclear weapons, some are formally neutral, some 
have a colonial past, and others had no significant foreign policy until they joined the EU. Clearly, 
this creates both opportunities and problems for sharing information.
Sharing Information during European Political Cooperation (1970–1993)
Following  the  Treaty  of  Westphalia  (1648),  states  became  the  key  actors  in  the  international 
5relations in Europe. Their diplomatic relations generally took place within a bilateral context. In an 
era, in which communication and travel were difficult and time‐consuming, ambassadors and their 
staff were the gatekeepers of information gathered in third states. Information was processed in the 
offices of the foreign ministers and the heads of state and government (Watson 1982). Multilateral 
conferences  such  as  the  Congress  of  Vienna (1814–1815)  were  limited  to  the  large  states  and 
focused  on  collective  security  (the  prevention  of  hegemony)  rather  than  the  coordination  or 
formulation of joint foreign policy (Kupchan and Kupchan 1991; Kissinger 1995). The League of 
Nations,  resulting  from Treaty  of  Versailles  (1919),  despite  its  own budget  and  civil  servants,  
focussed  on  collective  security  as  well.  After  the  Second  World  War,  the  creation  of  lasting 
collective defence organisations or  regional  organisations  (e.g.,  NATO, EU), where actual  joint 
decisions  vis‐à‐vis external  actors  are  made,  was  therefore  an  important  step  in  the  history  in 
international relations.
Although the European project was political in nature, its instruments were in the first place 
economic. Attempts at political integration, such as the European Defence Community (1950–1954) 
and  de  Gaulle's  proposal  for  a  Political  Union  (1960–1962),  all  failed,  illustrating  the  highly 
sensitive character of any cooperation in the area of high politics (Hoffmann 1966; Bodenheimer 
1967; Fursdon 1980). As the economic integration process proceeded in the context of the European 
Community, an external dimension developed through trade policies and relations with the former 
colonies  of  the  member  states.  However,  the  lack  of  a  forum  for  political  consultation  and 
information  exchange  became  increasingly  problematic.  Instruments  such  as  preferential  trade 
agreements lend themselves very well for political purposes. As a result, there was a need to add a 
political element to the external economic relations of the European Community (de Schoutheete 
1986). The heads of state and government of the six founding member states therefore asked their 
foreign ministers at the Hague summit (1969), only months after de Gaulle had left politics, ‘to 
study the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political unification’ (Final Communiqué).
Due to earlier failures and the sensitive character of political integration, cooperation in the 
field  of  external  political  relations  was  initially  developed  outside  the  legal  umbrella  of  the 
European  Community  under  the  framework  of  European  Political  Cooperation  (EPC).  It  was 
organised  on  a  purely  intergovernmental  basis  ‘with  a  bare  minimum of  institutional  support’ 
(Smith 2004, 71). The European Commission, for example, initially only participated in dossiers 
that had a clear connection to Community affairs. It took until the 1980s before it was granted full  
access  to  the  meetings.  The  weak role  of  the  Commission  together  with  the  lack  of  a  central 
secretariat gave a key position to the six‐monthly rotating Presidency. The initial ambitions of EPC 
were similarly modest. One of its main objectives was to work towards the harmonisation of views 
and ‘joint action when it appears feasible and desirable’ (Luxembourg Report 1970). There was no 
blueprint  for  cooperation  between  states  and  EPC grew  in  a  pragmatic  and  incremental  way, 
reacting to the needs of the time. The development of standard operating procedures took place 
informally often being codified in a series of reports. It was only with the Single European Act 
(1987) that the coordination of foreign policy received a formal treaty base.
The limited ambitions of EPC made it in the first place a potential forum for information‐
sharing. The exchange of information and consultation amongst member states is mentioned in its 
founding document as its first objective. Ben Tonra (2003, 744) indeed notes that ‘the raison d’être 
of EPC and later [Common Foreign and Security  Policy (CFSP)]  deliberations was,  of course, 
information’. The sharing of information was seen as the first step and a prerequisite for building a  
community of views and ultimately a community of action (de Schoutheete 1986). It would also 
allow states to profit from one another's areas of expertise and thus had particular value for smaller 
member states that  possessed limited diplomatic resources. The sharing of information was not 
automatic.  The  individual  member  states  determined  what  (not)  to  share  and  remained  the 
gatekeepers of information. During EPC, there was no collective information‐gathering nor was 
there  a  supranational  European  bureaucracy  to  analyse  the  material  systematically.  The  entire 
6process was in  the hands of the member states and the rotating Presidency operating from the 
national capitals. They processed the available information and used it for the purpose of common 
declarations.
One of the reasons for the eventual success of information‐sharing between member states 
was that this process was institutionalised from fairly early on (Smith 2004). In 1973, the member  
states  decided to establish the  so‐called  Correspondance Européenne (COREU) communication 
network, which allowed them and the European Commission to exchange enciphered messages (see 
Bicchi 2010). Each foreign ministry appointed one junior civil servant (European Correspondent) 
responsible for distributing the relevant information within the ministry and for sending it to the 
Permanent  Representation  of  their  country  in  Brussels.  Information  on  practical  organisational 
matters (e.g., invitations for meetings, agendas) as well as official diplomatic memorandums were 
transmitted  via  this  system.  By  virtue  of  the  continuous  contacts  facilitated  by  this  system of 
communication,  representatives  of  the  member  states could fine‐tune common declarations  and 
responses to parliamentary questions without having to meet in person (Nuttall 1992). Because the 
rotating Presidency was also in  charge of all  secretarial  matters,  the EPC archives moved to a 
different national capital every six months.
The sensitive nature of foreign policy coordination and the limited institutional support also 
affected the content and scope of the exchange of information. Initially only a limited number of 
dossiers  were  discussed  in  the  context  of  EPC.  The  agenda  was  determined  by  contemporary 
developments, above all by the bipolar international system with questions on matters of security 
and defence during the Cold War being reserved exclusively for NATO. In the early days, member 
states devoted a great deal of time to the coordination of their positions for the Helsinki Conference 
on Cooperation and Security in Europe (CSCE). The energy crisis and the Yom Kippur War (1975) 
put the Middle East high on the agenda and triggered the Euro–Arab dialogue. As foreign policy 
coordination developed, the range of issues, and thus the topics on which information was shared, 
gradually expanded. The London Report (1981), for example, raised the possibility of dealing with 
questions related to ‘the political aspects of security’ within EPC. Questions of defence, however, 
remained beyond its scope.
In addition to the problem of scope, a second consequence of the lack of a blueprint for the 
sharing of information between member states was that the perspective of EPC was quintessentially 
short‐term. Whenever there was a crisis in a non‐EU country, the member states would exchange 
views and try to coordinate a reaction in the form of a common declaration or other diplomatic 
actions  (e.g.,  démarches).  Although the  Copenhagen  Report  (1973)  recommended  medium and 
long‐term studies, no such studies were undertaken. No single body was, after all, in charge of long‐
term policy development. There was no central secretariat and after each six‐monthly Presidency 
was  over,  the  leadership  of  EPC  fell  to  another  member  state.  Two  initiatives  of  the  British 
Presidency in 1977 and 1981 to establish a modest planning facility failed as a result of French 
concerns  about  sovereignty.  Even  after  the  Single  European  Act  (1987)  created  a  small‐scale, 
though permanent, EPC secretariat in Brussels, the emphasis remained on short‐term coordination. 
Reports, strategy papers and analyses based on shared information were thus not circulated. Simon 
Nuttall (1992, 77) concluded that ‘planning has remained to this day one of the great lacunae in 
Political Co‐operation’.
The member states' reluctance to cede sovereignty in matters of foreign policy meant that 
they tried to keep the European Commission at arms length. The informational advantage of the 
Commission in the field of external economic relations nevertheless allowed it to enter through the 
backdoor. In practice, it was difficult to distinguish between the external dimension of economic 
integration and foreign policy proper. The Helsinki Conference on the CSCE, for example, included 
an economic basket, which rendered the expertise of the Commission indispensable. The use of 
sanctions  is  another  example  that  shows  how  member  states  depended  on  the  Commission. 
Although decisions to impose restrictive measures were taken under EPC, eventually such measures 
7had  to  be  implemented  by  the  European Commission.  The  importance  of  the  expertise  of  the 
Commission was acknowledged in the Single European Act when it was made responsible, together 
with the Presidency, for the consistency of external relations. The flow of information also worked 
in the other direction: when formulating and implementing policies within the framework of the 
European  Community,  the  Commission  could  profit  from information  on  the  political  context 
supplied by the member states (ibid.).
A further  characteristic  of  information‐sharing  under  EPC  was  that  it  extended  to  the 
embassies of the member states in third countries and international organisations. These embassies 
formed a source of information for the member states and were often at the same time the channels 
through which EPC policies could be implemented. A decision attached to the Single European Act 
refers to the following areas of cooperation: the exchange of political and economic information, 
the pooling of information on administrative and practical problems, communications, security and 
consular questions, health, education, information and cultural affairs.4 It is furthermore interesting 
to note that  the Commission participated in these meetings via its delegations. Again it  was an 
important source of expertise on economic issues. Initially cooperation in third countries was slow. 
Progress again depended on the rotating presidency as chair of the meetings and on the number of 
member states that were represented in the third country. Nowadays, weekly meetings of Heads of 
Mission are common practice in many third countries.
During the first few decades of European foreign policy cooperation, member states mostly 
confined  their  activities  to  exchanges  of  information.  The  information  transmitted  through  the 
COREU system and shared in various forums served in the first place to inform debates, and later 
found its way into declarations or political démarches. From an informational perspective, EPC was 
attractive in two ways. Firstly, the member states received access to new data and became part of a 
network well beyond that of their own diplomatic services. Given the different historical experience 
and geographical interests of the participants, the available expertise was considerable and much 
larger than most countries could acquire individually. With every enlargement round, the pool of 
data  further expanded.  Besides strengthened links  between the national  capitals,  the  diplomatic 
services in third countries also benefited from new information flows. Secondly, the system was set  
up in such a way that the national capitals remained the masters of the game. It was the member 
states who decided what to share with their partners. This was not without risk for those on the 
receiving end since information‐sharing can be used strategically to steer decisions in a particular 
direction. This problem could have been circumvented by entrusting tasks of information gathering 
and processing to the EU institutions. For most member states however, this was a step too far. 
Since EPC was merely a  declaratory policy the possible negative impact of sender‐biased data 
remained limited.
EPC has often been dismissed as nothing more than a discussion forum. It was nonetheless 
an indispensable step for the further development of a more fully‐fledged foreign policy. It not only 
created a habit of coordination but also contributed to the trust that was indispensable for more 
ambitious forms of informational cooperation.
European Foreign Policy after the Cold War
EPC was established during the Cold War, which determined to a large extent its foreign policy 
agenda. Not only were questions of defence addressed exclusively within the context of NATO, but 
the European states also had limited leeway in other areas since everything was seen through the 
lens  of  the  bipolar  balance.  The  situation  changed  after  the  fall  of  the  Berlin  wall,  when 
international relations began to be influenced by factors other than the East–West divide. It was felt  
that Europe now had the opportunity to act on the international stage independently of the United 
States. This line of reasoning was not necessarily naive, because some of the most important issues 
4 Decision adopted by the Foreign Ministers (17 February 1986).
8of the day required the close involvement of the EU. While Chancellor Kohl attempted to ignore the 
opinions of the other member states on German reunification, he had to talk with the European 
Commission  on whether  the  former German Democratic  Republic  was complying  with  all  the 
relevant European standards (Nuttall  2000).5 The end of the Cold War also meant  that Western 
Europe had to renegotiate its relations with the Central and Eastern European countries on matters 
such as preferential trading, international aid and even future accession.
The break‐up of former Yugoslavia also shows the nature of the involvement of the member 
states on matters of international significance. As this civil war (1991–1995) took place in Europe's 
backyard, the member states were closely involved with the various peace talks with the EU troïka, 
through the actions of the United Nations, but also through the EU administration in Mostar (1994–
1996).6 While the member states were not successful in bringing the conflict to a close, the point is 
that questions of war and peace were now being discussed in Brussels. The events resulting from 
the end of the Cold War thus affected the scope of the European foreign policy. The Treaty of 
Maastricht (1993, see also below) also made clear reference to this fact in the creation of the CFSP, 
which included according to the preamble ‘the eventual framing of a common defence policy’, as a 
successor policy to EPC.
The increased scope and importance of the European foreign policy agenda after the Cold 
War was reflected in the intensity of the information exchange between the member states. The 
number of COREUs issued increased significantly during this period, rising from approximately 
5000 messages per year before the Single European Act (1987) to 7500 around the end of the Cold 
War (1988–1990), and to more than 11,000 in 1991. The annual number of COREUs issued since 
1991 has remained fairly constant, indicating a level of maturity in the foreign policy agenda that 
has been evident since the early 1990s.7 These changes took place over a relatively short period and 
inevitably created new expectations. Yet as pointed out by Christopher Hill  (1993), in terms of 
actual capabilities rather little had changed from the 1980s. While his analysis applied to military 
capability  and  institutional  structures,  it  could  also  be  extended  to  information‐processing 
capability: despite the member states having increased their exchange of information, they were 
doing little in terms of information analysis and long‐term planning.
The  end  of  the  Cold  War  provided  the  momentum  for  discussions  of  a  new  form  of 
cooperation on foreign policy within the framework of the Maastricht Treaty. The member states 
spent  a  significant  amount  of  time  debating  its  institutional  structure.  The  future  role  of  the 
European Commission, in particular, led to heated debate. It had, after all, played a leadership role 
in German reunification and in Western European relations with the Central and Eastern European 
countries. Some member states argued that it could now act as an expert bureaucracy to carry out 
much of the information analysis. Especially for smaller member states with limited resources this 
was an attractive option from the perspective of efficiency as well as credibility. As a supranational  
body, the Commission was expected to be less biased and more likely to provide analyses taking 
into account the broader European interest. Many member states, however, felt that the Commission 
had already exceeded its authority and that it was time to put it back in its box. A compromise was 
eventually reached that allowed the Commission to participate more fully in policy discussions (for 
example through the shared  right  of initiative),  but  at  the  same time recognized the subsidiary 
nature of its role compared with that of the member states. The Maastricht Treaty did not extend the 
information‐processing capacity of the European Commission.
Despite  some  resentment  towards  these  arrangements,  Commission  President  Delors 
nevertheless  pressed  ahead  by  creating  the  position  of  Commissioner  for  External  Political 
Relations  with  a  supporting  Directorate‐General.  However,  these  changes  did  not  lead  to  an 
5 The German Democratic Republic became part of the internal market and thus had to comply with the acquis  
communitaire.
6 The EU Troika consisted of the Presidency‐in‐office as well as the preceding and succeeding presidencies. The 
administration in Mostar was part of an agreement between the Bosnian Croats and Muslims.
7 Information provided by the Council Secretariat. See also Smith (2004) and Bicchi (2010).
9increase in foreign policy analysis on the part of the Commission. In the absence of Commission 
initiatives,  the  leadership  in  CFSP after  Maastricht  thus  stayed  with  the  Presidency.  From an 
informational  perspective  not  much changed in  comparison to  EPC. The cooperation  remained 
limited to information‐sharing and the quality of the data depended entirely on what was provided 
by the individual  member states. However,  as European foreign policy in the post‐1989 period 
became more complex, the Presidency increasingly began to look to at the Council Secretariat's 
CFSP unit for administrative support and informational input.8 As a body under the direct control of 
the member states, it was preferred over the European Commission (Dijkstra 2008, 2010). Although 
the  Secretariat's  CFSP unit  was  engaged  in  conceptual  issues,  it  was  far  too  small  to  process 
information  adequately for the EU. Furthermore,  it  had to  rely on information supplied  by the 
member  states,  because  it  did  not  have  the  capacity  to  gather  information  on  its  own.  The 
continuing problems in  Bosnia,  and the  fact  that  the  United States  finally  became involved in 
bringing the conflict to an end, showed the limits of such institutional structures. It created the 
necessary momentum for the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) to establish a real analytical capacity in 
Brussels.
The Gathering and Processing of Information after the Amsterdam Treaty
The agenda of the Amsterdam Treaty was prepared by the Reflection Group, which consisted of 
national representatives under the chairmanship of Carlos Westendorp (June–December 1995). The 
Group met in parallel with the American‐led Dayton process, and it is thus hardly surprising that its  
report  urged the member states to ‘find ways and means of providing the Union with a greater 
capacity for external action’.  For this purpose,  the report  suggested improvements to the CFSP 
policy cycle. In order to prepare decisions, the report  noted ‘that an analysis, forecasting, early 
warning system and planning unit should be set up’. Such a unit could ensure ‘the necessary follow‐
up to crisis situations’ and could prepare ‘possible response and decision options’. The unit ‘could, 
moreover, encourage a common vision and greater cooperation among the member states. The latter 
and the Commission should in the unit share the information they possess so that correct analyses of  
the situations may be done’ (para 153). This body eventually became the Policy Planning and Early  
Warning Unit (the Policy Unit), and was located within the Council Secretariat.9
The Policy Unit worked for the High Representative for the CFSP, a new post created by the 
Treaty as well, and occupied by Javier Solana (1999–2009). It consisted of one seconded national 
official  per  member  state  and civil  servants  drawn from the  Council  Secretariat,  the  European 
Commission and the Western European Union adding up to approximately 35 civil servants.10 Its 
main function was to analyse information shared by the member states on topics of direct relevance 
to  CFSP.  However,  the  responsibility  for  analysing  information  in  the  Council  Secretariat  was 
extended beyond the  Policy  Unit.  The Directorate‐General  of  External  Relations  (DG E) grew 
substantially and its analytical functions became more extensive. In order to increase coherence and 
reduce  bureaucratic  rivalry,  some  parts  of  the  Policy  Unit  were  actually  integrated  into  this 
Directorate, leading to a nucleus of a European foreign service consisting of approximately 200 
civil servants (Duke and Vanhoonacker 2006).
In addition to these bureaucracies for  analysis,  the Amsterdam Treaty also provided the 
Council Secretariat with some limited information‐gathering capabilities, particularly through the 
establishment of European Union Special Representatives (EUSRs). While the EUSRs constitute a 
diverse group that includes both Brussels‐based envoys and locally‐based representatives, they have 
been described as the ‘ears and eyes’ of the High Representative and the member states in a number  
of conflict regions relevant to European foreign policy. They were no substitute for a proper foreign 
8 The EPC Secretariat was integrated into the Council Secretariat and became the CFSP unit.
9 When the EEAS will become operational, the Policy Unit will be integrated in this new service.
10 The Western European Union previously constituted the defence arm of the European Union.
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service, but they were appointed at Director‐General level, which gave them high‐level access to 
officials from third countries. Their support staffs, consisting of a few seconded national officials,  
reported extensively to the relevant units in the Council Secretariat (Grevi 2007). Several ‘double‐
hatting’ agreements,  where a EUSR also had an important United Nations function,  such as in 
Bosnia and Kosovo, gave them significant authority and unrivalled information‐gathering resources 
of great benefit to the Council Secretariat.
In parallel with these developments in the Council Secretariat, the services of the European 
Commission itself also professionalised after the Amsterdam Treaty. Under the leadership of the 
External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten (1999–2004), the Commission focused on improving 
its  systems  of  implementation  and  delivery,  which  gave  the  member  states  and  the  Council 
Secretariat  greater  freedom  to  focus  on  analysis  and  decision‐making  (Spence  2006).  The 
Commission delegations in third countries also underwent reform. The Commission, for example, 
opened various delegations in non‐ACP countries, thereby stressing its political role, and bringing 
the total number of these delegations to 130 (Bruter 1999). It ended the distinction between staff 
based in Brussels and those based in the delegations and made career progression dependent on 
experience in the latter. The number of A‐grade officials in the Commission delegations, as a result, 
increased from 165 to 440 (Spence 2004). Although the delegations received a formal function to 
report  on  the  situation  on  the  ground (Duke 2002),  in  practice  diplomatic  reporting  (and thus 
autonomous information‐gathering) remained somewhat limited (Bruter 1999). This was reflected 
in the still relatively low number of COREUs that originated from the Commission (f.e. 2.8 per cent 
of the total in 2008).11 
Although the way in which member states gather and process information changed in the 
CFSP following the Amsterdam Treaty, the most important developments resulted from the creation 
of  the  European  Security  and  Defence  Policy  (ESDP,  1999–present)  (Christiansen  and 
Vanhoonacker  2008;  Dijkstra  2008,  2010).  Previously,  informational  complexity  had  been 
somewhat limited in European foreign policy‐making. Common declarations, coordinated positions 
and occasional démarches in third countries did not require any extensive collection or analysis of 
information. The most complex cases were generally those relating to boundary dossiers, such as 
occurred during the reunification of Germany. In those dossiers the Commission provided much of 
the informational input. However, when the member states started to engage in common initiatives 
to send peacekeepers across the globe, the informational complexities increased and a demand for 
readily‐available high‐quality information emerged. The member states very quickly established 
various  bodies  within  the  Council  Secretariat  for  analysing information.  These  were  the  EU 
Military  Staff  (EUMS),  the  Civilian  Planning  and  Conduct  Capability  (CPCC)  and  the  Crisis 
Management  and  Planning  Directorate  (CMPD),  employing  up  to  400  A‐grade  officials.  Their 
wide‐ranging  duties  included  issuing  early  warning  reports,  military  strategic  options,  and 
monitoring ongoing operations. For more secretive work, the member states have established an 
Intelligence Division (INTDEV) and a Situation Centre (SITCEN) in charge of risk assessments for 
joint actions (Duke 2006).
Simultaneously a range of  information‐gathering capabilities were also established within 
the framework of the ESDP. Before agreeing to a joint operation, member states generally first send 
a fact‐finding mission to gather information or they establish a planning team on the ground. These 
teams  consist  of  members  of  the  Council  Secretariat  staff  and  they  report  via  the  High 
Representative to  the member states.  While these missions  are created on an ad hoc basis  and 
require the permission of the member states' ambassadors before they can take place, there are a 
growing number of instances where civil servants tour around third states before the member states 
formally  state  that  EU action  is  appropriate  — particularly  where  there  is  a  need for  a  rapid 
deployment. Not only do fact‐finding missions challenge the member states' role as gatekeepers of 
information, but their reports often form important input for draft decision‐making documents. The 
11 Information provided by Council Secretariat.
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Crisis  Management  Concept,  which  discusses  general  political  questions  such  as  the  level  of 
military presence, the mandate and the duration of joint action, draws on these fact‐finding missions 
(interviews Council Secretariat  officials, 2009). After Amsterdam information in the ESDP thus 
increasingly became gathered through autonomous channels.
Finally, information is also gathered continuously during ESDP operations. Depending on 
the difficulty of the mission, the force commander or head of mission on the ground sends daily, 
weekly and/or monthly reports to the member states and the Council Secretariat in Brussels. In the 
Council working groups, the member states can discuss points of relevance that are of interest to 
them in  the  written  reports  and can  request  further  information,  although in  most  cases  much 
discretion is  left  to  those in the field  and micro‐management  from Brussels  is  rare  (interviews 
national officials, 2009). Senior personnel from the field sometimes brief the member states in the 
various Council bodies in person, which is then followed by an exchange of views. At the same 
time, missions are permanently monitored from the Operational Headquarters (at  NATO and in 
selected lead‐nation member states) or from Brussels in the case of civilian missions. These bodies 
also provide the member states with up‐to‐date information. Needless to say, many member states 
continue their own information‐gathering efforts in countries with ESDP operations through their 
embassies  and  national  intelligence  officers.  National  contingents  also  often  send  information 
directly  to  their  national  capitals  notwithstanding  the  formal  chain  of  command.  The  point, 
however, is that the operations, the headquarters and the bureaucratic bodies in Brussels no longer 
fully rely on the member states for their information.
The Amsterdam Treaty constitutes a major breakthrough in terms of cooperation. For the 
first time, the member states moved beyond information‐sharing and established modest European‐
level bodies both to process and gather information. The creation of new players such as the Policy 
Unit,  the EUSRs, SITCEN and the  EUMS can be seen  as  the  direct  consequence  of  the EU's 
ambition to develop an operational  European foreign policy.  Sending troops and police officers 
abroad considerably raised the informational quality standards and brought new challenges in terms 
of efficiency. An informational system entirely based on the voluntary contributions of its member 
states was not only too slow, it also lacked reliability and credibility. While recognising the need to  
delegate information tasks to the European level, national ministries of foreign affairs nevertheless 
still  maintained  an  important  degree  of  control.  They  entrusted  the  new  tasks  to  the  Council  
Secretariat  rather  than  to  the  European  Commission  and  staffed  the  units  with  a  majority  of 
seconded national diplomats. The input of the Commission and its external delegations was not 
sufficiently  integrated and the heavy reliance on seconded national  diplomats  sustained the old 
problem of sender‐biased information.
The Lisbon Treaty is the most recent attempt to address some of these limitations and further 
strengthens the European‐level capabilities of information‐gathering and processing. The External 
Action  Service  has  the  potential  to  provide  the  Union  with  the  long‐awaited  Brussels  expert 
bureaucracy. By bringing together civil servants from the member states, the Commission and the 
Council Secretariat and by creating single geographical and thematic desks, it bundles information 
previously scattered over different institutions (Avery et  al.  2007; Kurpas et  al.  2007). With an 
eventual composition of several thousand diplomats, civil servants and military staff, the EEAS will 
considerably expand the Union's capacities for autonomous analysis. The 130 Union delegations 
directly reporting to the High Representative and the EEAS will furthermore significantly increase 
the pool of data to be processed.  In addition,  the scope of information will  take account of all 
dimensions of EU external relations including trade, development and CFSP. The consequences are 
also important. There is a serious chance that the Brussels‐based foreign policy administration may 
develop a strong informational surpluses vis‐à‐vis the member states. Although it may still take 
some time before the new machinery is fully operational, it is likely that in the long term this will 
have an impact on the European foreign policy process.
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Conclusions
The gathering and processing of foreign policy information was traditionally an activity of states 
performed by ministries of foreign affairs and embassies. Due to the strong notion of ‘self‐help’, 
information‐sharing  was  limited  and  mainly  organised  bilaterally  with  low  levels  of 
institutionalisation.  After  the  Second  World  War,  there  was  an  increasing  tendency  to  share 
information within multilateral and regional organisations, but here also the flows of information 
depended to a large extent on what the member states were willing to share (Stone 2009). If in  
certain cases, such as that of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the organisation 
carried out its own fact‐finding, the process of information‐gathering and processing was mostly 
confined to a limited number of issue areas and did not deal with foreign policy in its entirety. 
Foreign policy coordination in the context of the European Union thus constitutes an important 
break with  previous practice,  in that  the  multilateral  exchange of  foreign policy information is 
highly  institutionalised  and has  a  broad scope that  covers  most  aspects  of  foreign  policy.  The 
member states have furthermore established bodies in Brussels for analysing information to support 
their  decisions  and  actions,  and  have  even  created  a  limited  number  of  information‐gathering 
channels.  The  Lisbon  Treaty  and  the  creation  of  the  EEAS  further  expand  the  capacities  for 
autonomous information gathering and processing.
The development of a European system of mere information sharing into one of autonomous 
information‐gathering and processing has taken a long time and has been difficult. For almost 30 
years,  the  member  states  maintained  firm  control  of  their  own  capabilities  for  gathering  and 
analysing information, thereby maintaining the maximum possible control over information flows. 
The national capitals were thus the centres of informational gravity rather than Brussels. Yet the end 
of the Cold War and the development of a role for the EU in crisis management demanded a greater 
degree of continuity, together with a more medium and long‐term approach, and new requirements 
in terms of the quality and speed of delivery of information. The ad hoc character of the information 
flow provided by the member states increasingly conflicted with the functional need for efficiency. 
Decisions to engage in military or civilian operations furthermore required permanent bodies that 
could  provide  the  much  needed  common  analysis  of  foreign  policy  problems.  Gradually, 
information‐related tasks were delegated to the Brussels‐based institutions,  culminating into the 
creation of the EEAS.
This article is a first attempt to describe and explain the development of the European Union 
from  a  platform  to  share  foreign  policy  information  into  an  actor  that  gathers  and  processes 
information autonomously. The study of European foreign policy from an ‘information viewpoint’ 
is not merely interesting from an historical perspective. A more in‐depth study of information flows, 
both in quantitative and qualitative terms, and how they are translated into influence, could shed 
new light  on the  EU foreign policy‐making process in general.  The EEAS as  a  new centre  of 
foreign policy expertise provides us with interesting new empirical material to investigate to which 
extent  informational  asymmetries  lead  to  an  advantage  in  policy‐making.  Answering  these 
questions would greatly benefit  our understanding of the dynamics of European foreign policy‐
making.
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